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As it can be seen, G. Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law”is most capable of theoretically substantiating theimposition of certain rights on robots, which wouldlegally assume the status of an electronic / mechan-ical person. It should be taken into account that theterm “electronic person” has already been adopted byboth international and most national institutions.Based on the approach of the theory of “pure law”, itis concluded that an electronic person can be inter-preted as a personified unity of legal norms thatoblige and authorize artificial intelligence with thecriteria of “rationality”.The study of the problems of legal capacity of elec-tronic persons confirms the need to form a funda-mentally new toolkit for legal regulation, which isassociated with the specifics of electronic persons,characterized primarily by the difficulties of localiz-ing their legally significant behavior.

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Abstract

As it can be seen, G. Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law”is most capable of theoretically substantiating theimposition of certain rights on robots, which wouldlegally assume the status of an electronic / mechan-ical person. It should be taken into account that theterm “electronic person” has already been adopted byboth international and most national institutions.Based on the approach of the theory of “pure law”, itis concluded that an electronic person can be inter-preted as a personified unity of legal norms thatoblige and authorize artificial intelligence with thecriteria of “rationality”.The study of the problems of legal capacity of elec-tronic persons confirms the need to form a funda-mentally new toolkit for legal regulation, which isassociated with the specifics of electronic persons,characterized primarily by the difficulties of localiz-ing their legally significant behavior.

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  Submitted
Nov 17, 2022
Published
Aug 17, 2022
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